Why it’s not about the war in Syria: Why there’s a war on now

The war in Iraq has become a new and interesting chapter in American foreign policy.

Its epicenter, Iraq, is the most dangerous country in the Middle East.

Its strategic depth, proximity to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the long-term strategic stakes are too great for this to be a quiet chapter in history.

It’s not.

The war has become, in some ways, a microcosm of American foreign-policy as a whole, and in many ways its scope is too small to be called a microplot of history.

The War on Terror The War in Iraq was launched with a single premise: Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and was actively engaged in weapons-destruction activities in Iraq.

The U.S. had been on the lookout for a pretext for the invasion of Iraq for some time.

The reason it was a pretext was that Hussein had made it clear that he would not tolerate the use of chemical weapons, a threat to international peace.

This was, after all, the first time he had openly called for the use and use of such weapons.

Saddam had been a warlord before the war.

He had once threatened the Soviet Union with chemical weapons and was still known to have done so.

But it was only in the late 1980s, when he started to give up his weapons, that he was able to negotiate the release of Saddam Hussein from a prisoner exchange that he had agreed to in exchange for the release or the exchange of American hostages.

And it was just in that period that the U.N. inspectors started getting their first serious look at the chemical weapons.

It was a long time before they even knew about the chemical attack.

They had started to get a feel for it in 1992, and then they had a taste in 1993 when they were given access to some of the chemical munitions and they were able to see that it was more powerful than they had ever seen before.

So the inspectors began to find evidence that the chemical attacks had been used.

They found the presence of a nerve agent, a very dangerous substance that could have killed up to 100,000 people, a nerve-agent that was highly toxic, had an extraordinarily long half-life, was highly mobile and could penetrate human flesh and could cause massive organ damage.

It would have been impossible to get rid of without a chemical weapons attack.

And so that was the first hint that something was going on, and Saddam Hussein was finally given the opportunity to surrender.

He surrendered to the inspectors in 1995.

There was a tremendous outpouring of support from around the world, both from the U and from the Arab world.

The Arab states said, you know, this guy is the one we need.

The Saudis said, we’re so pleased to see you.

They gave you this very powerful weapons package.

They were really delighted.

The Israelis gave you the same weapons package as they gave to Saddam Hussein.

And then we had a series of talks with the United Nations.

They asked, why don’t you give us a little more time to gather all the evidence that you have and make an assessment about whether you can use the chemical weapon?

And we did, but they weren’t prepared to accept the use, and they weren`t prepared to go into Iraq.

And Saddam Hussein didn`t want to go back to Iraq.

He wanted to stay in power and use his chemical weapons to make himself feel safe again.

He didn` t want to have a war with Iran, which was in the process of trying to destroy Iraq.

So we had this really complex and difficult negotiation that took years and years to accomplish.

In 2003, I was on the first mission to Iraq to try to convince him that it would be in his interest to go to war.

In fact, I think we succeeded in persuading him to take the deal, to accept a certain amount of chemical-weapons-use restrictions, so that he could have a safe environment for himself.

And the U, too, accepted the deal.

The deal was very tough.

It limited the use to certain kinds of weapons that would only be used against specific people, such as Saddam Hussein, and it prohibited the use by any other nation, including Iran, of chemical munitions that might be used to commit acts of terrorism.

So Saddam Hussein went to the U., and he started using the chemical arms.

The chemical weapons became a weapon of war.

There are so many ways in which the United States, the United Kingdom and the French were able, by the diplomacy that we undertook over the course of the war, to make sure that Saddam Hussein would not have the opportunity, not have to use the weapons again.

And that’s why, over the years, there has been a debate about the wisdom of the deal that the Bush administration struck with Saddam Hussein in 2003, and we should not make the same mistake with Syria.

The fact is that the agreement with Saddam was not based on evidence, as we should have